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ABSTRACT 
The globalization of engineering activities is a recent, growing phenomenon (Harfi, Mathieu 
& Pfister, 2007). It is particularly noteworthy in the car industry, where the question of why 
and how to go about that globalization is a major challenge for firms (Calabrese, 2001; 
Sagiyama & Fujimoto, 2000; Miller, 1994). This paper is based on three years of cooperation 
with a European car manufacturer where we adopted a research-intervention methodology 
(Hatchuel & David, 2008; Sardas & Lefebvre, 2004). In our exploration of the implications of 
the creation of a new engineering unit abroad, we have mobilized two analytical models 
which enable us to understand the large staff turnover observed during the creation of the new 
unit. 
The "internal R&D professional group dynamics" ("dynamique de metier",) (Lefebvre, Roos 
& Sardas, 2002; Roos, 2006), hereafter referred to simply as the "professional group 
dynamics", is above all an analytical model in which three interacting sub-dynamics are 
distinguished: the collective dynamics of expertise (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995); the dynamics 
of roles and their interactions; and the dynamics of collective and individual identities. It is 
secondly a tool for structuring and management, in so far as it acts primarily on the systems of 
roles offered to individuals, as well as on the modalities of knowledge management. 
In the "global actor dynamic" model (Sardas, 1994), an individual's dynamic is seen as three 
partial, interlinking dynamics: a cognitive dynamic, a strategic dynamic (Crozier & Friedberg, 
1977) and a subjective dynamic (Dejours & Sardas, 2001). This model is designed to 
diagnose the encounter between an individual and an organization, from a management 
science point of view. 
Our analysis of the firm's first experiments in globalizing its engineering unit shows that the 
relational deficiencies resulting from actors' games led to blockage in the designers' learning 
dynamics and caused their dynamic of subjective investment to dwindle. As a result they 
either became apathetic or they resigned. We can conclude that three conditions are necessary 
if a designer is to learn: an activity in which new knowledge is acquired; a co-located expert 
collective that provides the conditions for adequate technical supervision; and the presence of 
related expertise. 
To analyse the subject in depth and to shed light on concrete decisions (how many people 
were recruited, how many expatriates, etc.), we developed a numeric model for simulating the 
process of growth and expansion of the competencies of an international engineering unit. 
This enabled us to assess the time-scale of this process and its sensitivity to staff turnover, 
which is a major risk in this type of project. 
Finally, by reviewing our approach and the models and reasoning applied, we examine the 
contingency factors of this globalization model.  
 
Keywords: globalization of engineering, internal R&D professional group dynamics, actor 
dynamics, staff turnover, contingency factors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
General context: 
Observers of change in engineering activities have noted two constantly growing 
phenomena over the past fifteen years (Harfi, Mathieu & Pfister, 2007): both industrialized 
countries and emergent countries are relying more and more on research and development 
activities; and this world-wide trend is characterized by increasing globalization of R&D 
(especially due to multinationals' activities). 
These changes are a response to the saturation of markets in developed countries. They 
confront firms and researchers with two main questions: what impact will the globalization of 
engineering activities have on the dynamics of design resources, and what models can be used 
to study this phenomenon? 
These questions are particularly salient in the car industry (Humphrey, Lecler & 
Salerno, 2000). Debate is currently focused on emergent global organizational configurations 
(concentrated configuration or distributed configuration, Calabrese, 2001; Miller, 1994), but 
some authors have emphasized the importance of focusing more specifically on the dynamics 
of manufacturers' resources (Sagiyama & Fujimoto, 2000) and especially of human resources 
in design, to understand the globalization of engineering activities. 
In the broad trends outlined above we have identified a major challenge for all firms: 
how can R&D resources scattered throughout the world be managed? And, before that, how 
should R&D resources be distributed? It is the latter question that we will examine here, 
based on our research-intervention in the Car Body Engineering Department of a large 
European car manufacturer. 
The manufacturer's industrial strategy 
The European car manufacturer with which we undertook this intervention has been 
intensifying its globalization strategy since 2004. This strategy concerns engineering activities 
and was materialized in the decision to create two units for developing new vehicles: one in 
Eastern Europe and one in Asia. 
In this section we examine the creation of the Eastern European unit. The firm put 
forward the following arguments to justify its creation of globalized engineering units. First, it 
argued that products would thus be better suited to their markets, owing to geographic 
proximity. Second, it maintained that, assuming that skills were equivalent, it would be able 
to design vehicles that would not be economically viable under different conditions where 
labour costs were higher.  
 
Research-intervention methodology 
The car manufacturer requested the presence of a team of participant researchers 
(Sardas & Lefebvre, 2004; Hatchuel & David, 2008). This accompaniment lasted for three 
years, during which the junior researcher was fully immersed in one of the firm's large 
engineering departments. The results presented here are therefore the fruit of long-term 
collaboration between the researchers and the firm, following a series of several other 
common projects over the preceding seven years. 
 
Main organizing principles 
The creation of development centres raises the question of the overall structure of an 
engineering department with units in other countries. The organizational chart drawn up by 
management shows that the local engineering department in Eastern Europe has to be able to 
take over the development of a complete vehicle a few months before its style is determined. 
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In the target organizational chart, the central engineering department is in charge of the 
preliminary project covering the exploratory phase (consisting in exploring the main 
hypotheses of services offered to the customer at a set cost) and the preparatory phase 
(consisting in validating the main lines of the product and process concept). It is at the 
beginning of the project development, during the general design phase (the objective being to 
obtain a feasible design, defined with precision), that the project is to be handed over from the 
central engineering department to the Eastern European development centre. 
 
GLOBAL ENGINEERING 
 
Figure 1: Main organizing principles 
Main questions posed by the project of globalizing engineering activities 
On the basis of this scenario, it was necessary to define the types and quantities of 
human resources required by the Eastern European development centre. It was also necessary 
to be able to determine how the growing competencies of this development centre would be 
accompanied ("missionaries" devoted to a vehicle project or expatriates devoted to training 
and supervising local resources; quantity and characteristics of the supervisors; nature, 
quantity and rhythm of recruitment; modes of training of new recruits, etc.), and what the 
time-scale of the process would be (number of years needed to attain certain numbers of 
employees and sufficient autonomy). 
 
QUALIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND ANALYTICAL MODEL 
 
Qualification of the research question and analytical model: How can a subsidiary engineering 
unit be created from a central parent unit? 
In this paper we explore the implications of the creation of a new engineering unit 
abroad. In the case of the Eastern European unit, it is possible, on the scale of that unit, to 
consider the creation as a process of filiation designed to reproduce certain design capacities 
and to make them autonomous, without at that stage challenging the structuring and dynamics 
of the design resources at the parent company (central engineering). 
 
Although we cannot analyse this point within the scope of this paper, we wish to point 
out that the filiation process has feedback effects on the mother company, and that these 
warrant closer attention. The central engineering unit in the firm studied here is itself 
undergoing a process of change which is necessary if it is to act as a "teacher" for the newly-
created units. For an all-encompassing view of the changes triggered by the globalization of 
engineering activities, we need to reason in terms of the global dynamic of the internal R&D 
professionals' resources spread between the central engineering unit and all the units abroad. 
 
Once the goals of the project to set up an engineering unit have been clarified, the firm 
has to create and facilitate the local development of the required "professional group 
dynamics". We now wish to show that the globalization project needs to be thought of in 
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terms of the creation of "professional group dynamics". For this purpose we will use the 
"dynamique de metier" (what we have called "professional groups dynamic") model proposed 
by Lefebvre, Roos & Sardas (2002), Roos (2006) and Acquier & Eyherabide (2005). 
 
The "professional group dynamic" model as a framework of analysis 
This model is above all a framework of analysis for the functioning of a profession 
within a firm. We will analyse: 
• Knowledge dynamics: how is knowledge produced and distributed? How is it transmitted 
within the collective? How vital are these knowledge dynamics? (Argyris & Schön, 1978; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) 
• The dynamics of roles and their interactions: what are the different roles actually and how 
are they differentiated? What is the nature of their interactions? 
• The dynamics of identities: to what extent is the collective's identity recognized within the 
organization? How does this collective identity serve to support the construction of 
individual identities (Sainsaulieu, 1977; Dubar, 1994)? What are the various individual 
career paths and do these paths form the basis for the construction of identities? Finally, 
how is the collective dynamic based on the identity dynamics of certain individuals who 
constitute the "mainstays of the profession". 
 
The professional group dynamic as an object of structuring and management 
As the professional group dynamic becomes an object of structuring and 
management1, it is possible to act on the redefinition of the system of roles proposed, of 
possible careers, and of fields of knowledge, and on the modalities of knowledge management 
(roles dedicated or not, knowledge-management tools, creation and leadership of communities 
of practice or of expertise in areas of knowledge). These different organizational and 
management actions aim to generate a new professional group dynamic that meets the 
challenge of performance and is sustainable for individuals. 
 
In former studies the professional group dynamics model concerned the reorientation 
of the dynamics of changing design professions. In the present case the aim was initially not 
to transform these professions (that happened afterwards, as a consequence), but to enable 
them to produce a new entity (and then others) in other countries. In this sense it implied the 
creation of new professional group dynamics, so that the new delocalized unit could be set up 
by the central engineering department. The project to create an engineering unit in Eastern 
Europe should therefore be seen as an experiment that needed to be managed. 
 
The project to globalize engineering activities, seen as an experiment that brings problems to 
the fore 
Without explicitly considering the globalization project as an experiment, the 
European car manufacturer made an experimental approach possible, mainly by requesting 
the collaboration of a team of participant researchers. Two and a half years after the beginning 
of the project to create an engineering unit in Eastern Europe, the recognition of the 
experimental nature of the project proved to be relevant: in certain professions the staff 
turnover was huge (up to two-thirds of the employees in a profession), which called into 
question the feasibility of the globalization project. The causes for these resignations had to be 
analysed and understood. 
 
                                                 
1
 This is an important result of the "rationalization of design and recomposition of designers' professional 
dynamics" programme supported by the Ministry of Research under the "Work" programme. The profession thus 
becomes an object of rationalization whereas until recently the project was the main object of rationalization in 
R&D. 
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Interpretation of the problems encountered, using the global actor dynamic model 
We are now going to examine the causes for such a high staff turnover by analysing a 
profession in the Eastern European unit: product calculation. 
In this analysis we apply the global actor dynamic model (Sardas, 1994) in which an 
individual's dynamic is conceived of as three interlinking partial dynamics: a cognitive 
dynamic, a strategic dynamic (Crozier & Friedbert, 1977), and a subjective dynamic (Dejours, 
1990; Sardas, 2001). This model is designed to synthetically diagnose the encounter between 
the individual and the organization from the management science point of view: to what 
extent can the individual fulfil the role offered by the organization? – whether individual 
refers to a single person or a generic category of actors. In this sense, the approach is situated 
on an individual scale but takes into account interactions with other actors, essentially by 
considering the dynamics of work collectives and professional group collectives (which links 
it to the professional group dynamic presented above). This diagnosis should serve to explain 
the causes of the difficulties experienced by designers, or to anticipate them in the framework 
of an ex ante analysis of the real functioning of an organizational scenario. The global actor 
dynamic is thus an analytical tool for understanding questions of performance and the 
implications of occupational health. 
 
ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT CONCERNING THE CALCULATORS' 
PROFESSION IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ENGINEERING UNIT, USING THE 
IDENTITY DYNAMICS MODEL 
 
Our aim is to understand the causes of the very high staff turnover during the first experiment 
in forming a team of "calculators". For this purpose we will first briefly present the 
characteristics of the profession. 
 
Characteristics of the calculators' profession in Eastern Europe 
After analysing the activity in cooperation with the profession expert of the central 
engineering department, the calculator's work can be characterized by four levels of 
competencies. These levels can be linked to the roles and modes of transmission of 
knowledge, as shown in the following table. 
Competency level Place of 
knowledge 
transmission 
Mode of knowledge transmission Role 
Level 1: basic functioning of 
numeric tools and theoretical 
background 
Learning in class and through case 
studies Apprentice 
Common 
knowledge, 
dispensed outside 
the firm (in 
universities, 
schools, etc.) 
Level 2: analysis of a given service 
(being capable of choosing a 
model, making it "work", and 
analysing the results in terms of a 
service) 
Learning-by-doing and under the 
supervision of an experienced person 
within the profession or through 
interaction between senior peers within 
the profession 
Junior 
 
 
 
Senior 
Level 3: calculating the 
proportions of a car body (being 
capable of taking into account the 
different services and constraints 
of other occupations) 
Learning-by-doing and through 
interaction between peers within the 
profession, with the support of the 
profession expert, as well as through 
interaction with the technical managers 
of related occupations 
 
 
Project 
expert 
Level 4: Innovating on the models 
and supporting the project experts 
where necessary; being in charge 
of capitalizing on knowledge and 
of the professional group dynamics 
through the roles offered to 
individuals 
Knowledge 
particular to a firm, 
created and 
transmitted by the 
profession 
Learning through interaction between 
peers within the profession and through 
interaction with the technical managers 
of related occupations 
 
 
Profession 
expert 
Figure2: Level and transmission of competencies in calculation 
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This synthesis will enable us to analyse the global actor dynamics of the calculators' 
profession. 
 
Expected results of the attempt to create a professional team of calculators in Eastern Europe 
People with professional experience are difficult to find in the Eastern European job 
market. In our case study a PhD with partial experience in calculation models was trained in 
specific skills relative to the car body, for an 18-month period in 2004, at the central 
engineering department. He then had to train new recruits and was himself supervised for a 
year by a project expert "missionary" from the central engineering department. After this 
period he trained new recruits alone, with distance support from the central engineering 
department. The activities entrusted to the Eastern European structure dimensioning team 
were of the service analysis type (level 2) and had to be controlled from the central 
engineering department by a project expert. 
 
Analysis of the real functioning of the calculation team in Eastern Europe: the sequence of 
causes leading to resignations 
 
In this section we present the synthesis of our analyses, based on in-depth interviews with the 
actors concerned (on site and at the central engineering department), and on our participation 
in various work sessions or teleconferences between the managers concerned. 
 
• The cognitive dimension: blockage in the learning dynamic 
 
The new recruits were technically unable to do the job. They felt that local 
management and distance management by the central engineering department were 
insufficient. The training load had been under-estimated and there were too many new 
recruits. Some noted the local manager's lack of knowledge, especially on technical aspects 
relative to analytical activities and on the load that such activities represented. We can see that 
the cognitive dynamic for a generic actor in calculation was blocked, and that this blockage 
cannot be dissociated from the strategic dimension. 
 
• The strategic dimension: a deficiency of relations necessary for learning 
 
Strategic relations between the project representative at the central engineering department 
and the local Eastern European team: 
Leadership of the delegated activity in Romania was entrusted to a level-4 engineer 
from the central engineering department, who had to report on the quality of R&D work with 
very short notice. Relations between this engineer and the Eastern European team were 
initially supposed to be a partnership; however, through the strategic play of the different 
actors, they turned into principal/sub-contractor relations, where results took precedence over 
learning. 
 
Strategic relations between the representative of the profession at central level and the local 
Eastern European team: 
Support for the local Eastern European teams by managers at central level was 
complicated due to under-estimation of the need for supervision and to competition (in terms 
of demand for supervision) between the Eastern European team and the Asian team. The 
profession expert at central level in charge of distance technical supervision favoured the 
Asian team as its technical level was higher. This made supervision of that team more 
attractive than supervision of the Eastern European team, which was consequently neglected. 
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Strategic relations between the local manager and the local team of calculators: 
Technical support by the local manager was inadequate due to a lack of technical 
competencies but also to a vertical, top-down conception of authority stemming from the 
principles of the former authoritarian and bureaucratic regime of this Eastern European 
dictatorship (he had had positions in the former state hierarchy). Without a peer in his own 
profession, he was unable to learn. Several members of his team therefore gradually became 
more skilled in the activity than he was, without being able to influence his management 
choices, especially the management of the workload in terms of quantity and difficulty. This 
manager found himself in a tricky position where he preferred to avoid refusing activities 
delegated by the central unit. He felt that doing so would have been an acknowledgement of 
his own and his team's technical shortcomings. 
 
Strategic relations between the local HR manager and the local calculation team: 
The local human resource managers did not recognize the complexity of the activity 
and failed to differentiate, in terms of salary and role, between calculation and the archiving 
of technical data (a very simple job). Moreover, this HR actor attributed more value to 
manufacturing than to R&D (his value criterion was the number of cars produced). 
 
• The subjective dimension: from a deficit of "external recognition" to a deficit of 
"internal recognition": 
 
The fact that the quality of the calculation team's work in Eastern Europe was deemed 
to be poor, was naturally a negative reflection on the local calculators who were sometimes 
considered as incompetent. This negative image was compounded by the lack of recognition 
by the local HR manager. Faced with the lack of "external recognition" (which appeared in 
the strategic dimension), the way in which the Eastern European calculators considered 
themselves was important because it was what motivated their decision to resign rather than 
fighting for recognition. 
 
To sum up, we can synthesize the causal chain leading to the resignations as follows: 
 
 
Relational deficiencies resulting from strategic dynamics Blockage of cognitive dynamic 
 Dwindling of the subjective investment dynamic  resignation or apathy 
 
 
Lessons learned 
On the basis of the above analysis (of the encounter between the role and environment 
offered by the organization, on the one hand, and the individual's capacities for learning and 
his/her strategic resources and subjective expectations, on the other) we can carry out an 
organizational diagnosis of the real functioning of the organization. This diagnosis, 
concerning the calculators' profession, reveals a key issue to consider as regards the question 
of the creation of a subsidiary engineering unit. This issue pertains to individuals' conditions 
of integration and learning. 
 
We established the general relevance of this result by studying two other engineering 
activities, and showed that there are three conditions on which an individual can learn: 1) an 
activity that is conducive to learning; 2) a co-located professional collective which provides 
adequate conditions for technical supervision; and 3) other elements concerning the work 
collective (presence of other related professions and other functions). The analysis of these 
conditions enabled us to produce initial knowledge on the firm's globalization of its 
engineering department and thus to answer the following questions mentioned in the 
introduction: what type and quantity of human resources should be recruited? How many 
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expatriates should be sent to the local unit? What should the expatriates' role be? On what 
criteria should they be selected? What activity should be delegated to the local unit? Finally, 
how do the answers to these questions evolve over time? 
 
MODELLING AND SIMULATION OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE BIRTH OF AN 
ENGINEERING UNIT ABROAD 
Modelling 
Based on our findings, we propose a model of the conditions that need to be met for 
individuals to be integrated and to learn. 
 
Structuring of the professional groups according to level of competencies 
This model segments the type of activity by profession and structures each profession 
into five levels of competency, based on the complexity of the design (a study of each of these 
professions showed that this generic segmentation was robust). In the diagram below each 
circle represents a level of competence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Structuring of a profession according to level of competence 
The conditions of an individual's progression: intra- and inter-professional work collective 
For each competency level we model the work collective needed for an individual to 
progress technically, as well as the competencies that he or she would be required to have. For 
example, as the diagram below shows, a project expert (level 4 in terms of competencies) 
needs a profession expert (level 5 in terms of competencies) for technical support within his 
or her own profession, as well as one of the project experts from a related profession (level 4 
in terms of competencies) in order to progress technically in his or her own field and do his or 
her job (here, we have taken a case where only one related profession is necessary). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The work collective, conditions on which an individual progresses 
 
The links between the circles represents the presence of other competencies (in terms 
of level of expertise) that allow for learning to take place. The project expert in calculation 
had to go through the levels of Apprentice, Junior and finally Senior before attaining the 
project expert level. 
The partial architecture of learning links can then be represented by the diagram below 
which shows interactions between professions. The numbers on the links indicate the 
Apprentic
e 
Junior 
Senior 
Project expert 
Profession. expert 
Profession 
Apprentic
e 
Junior 
Senior 
Project expert 
Profession. expert  
Profession 
Apprentic
e 
Junior 
Senior 
Project expert 
Profession. expert 
Profession 
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supervisory capacity required for the profession specialities (vertical; supervision of 1 to "x" 
individuals from the level beneath) and the needs for inter-professional presence (horizontal). 
Note that, for the sake of confidentiality, the numbers in this paper are only examples. 
As regards the professions, represented vertically, we have given two numbers (a minimum 
and a maximum) at each competency level, for an individual's supervisory capacity (essential 
parameter representing the number of individuals of a lower level whose upper level can 
simultaneously serve as supervisors). This parameter is then modulated in relation to the 
project load weighing at a particular point in time on an individual with that competency level 
(rate of activity). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Architecture of the learning links and conditions of learning 
 
The time-scale of individual learning 
On the basis of our analysis of careers at the central engineering department we have 
specified the average time needed for an individual to progress, when all the conditions for 
integration and learning are met. Our results are consistent with the analyses of Pelz & 
Andrews (1976). For the sake of confidentiality, we reason here in terms of time units. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Average time needed for an individual to progress 
Apprenti 
Junior 
Senior 
Expert Projet 
profession 
expert 
Profession 3 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
Apprentic
e 
Junior 
Senior 
Project expert 
Profession 
expert 
Profession 2 
[1 ] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ] 
[1 ] 
[1 ] 
[1 ] 
[1 ] 
Apprentic
e 
Junior 
Senior 
Project expert 
Profession 
expert 
Profession 4 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
Apprentic
e 
Junior 
Senior 
Project expert 
Profession 
expert 
Profession 1 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ;x] 
[1 ] 
[1 ] 
[1 ] 
Profession expert – Level 5 
Project expert – Level 4 
Senior – Level 3 
Junior – Level 2 
Apprentice – Level 1 
Competency level 
[0 ;5[ [5 ;20[ [20 ;40[ [40 ;65[ 
Time unit 
[65 ;+[ 
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Simulation of the process of creation of an engineering unit 
This modelling enables us to simulate the dynamics of an engineering unit (in the 
framework of relatively stable design activities). It serves to estimate, in relation to the 
number of expatriates in each profession speciality, and in relation to the actual learning of 
resources and the turnover, the number of new recruits that can be integrated over a certain 
period of time. It also allows us to determine the time required for the engineering unit to be 
able to perform major activities of increasing complexity. 
To characterize an engineering unit's complexity, we distinguish four levels of 
decreasing complexity: A, B, C and D. When there are only apprentices and juniors the 
engineering unit can perform only support activities (qualified as level D). When there is at 
least one senior in each speciality, the engineering unit can perform slight adjustments on 
existing products (level C). When there is at least one project expert in each of the profession 
specialities, the support unit can develop a vehicle for which 65% of the design has already 
been specified – assuming that this specification has been done according to the rules of the 
art (level B). Finally, when there is a profession expert in each speciality, the unit is able to 
develop an entire car (level A). 
If the model is applied to four professions with some expatriates for each of them, in a 
country that has no designer with professional experience in the areas concerned, the 
simulation enables us to estimate the progression represented by the graph below. This 
simulation indicates the number of time units necessary to master the basic design levels 
(level C in 20 time units) and the more complex ones (level B in 40 time units and A in 65 
time units). It also indicates the sustainable growth in terms of staff numbers (growth relative 
to the technical supervisory capacities of the local employees and expatriates). For example, it 
is possible here to have 600 individuals after about 75 time units. The blue peaks on the graph 
indicate the number and timing of new recruitments. 
 
Figure 7: Simulation of the creation process without staff turnover 
 
It is possible to parametrize a level of turnover to estimate its impact on the 
progression of an engineering unit abroad. The diagram below represents the progression of 
the same situation as in the one above, but with a staff turnover of 10%. We see that with 75 
time units, a staff of only 500 can be attained, against 600 in the situation without turnover, 
and that it takes 15 additional time units to reach the highest level (level A). 
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Figure 8: Simulation of the creation process with a staff turnover of 10% 
 
This simulation enables us to revise the principles and process of creation of 
engineering units abroad, and to propose a new way of characterizing the globalization of 
engineering activities which is coherent with the characteristics and general particularities 
outlined in the first part. It enables us to focus not only on the external aspect of the 
phenomenon but also on the firm's internal considerations. 
 
Proposed principles for the globalization of engineering activities 
The modelling and simulation described above enables us to propose new 
management knowledge concerning the process of globalization of engineering activities. 
They enable us to discuss the main questions usually posed, such as the choice of location, the 
number of expatriates, the duration of expatriations, the quantitative progression of resources, 
the qualitative maturity of engineering units, etc. 
It shifts the usual approach to the globalization of engineering activities, from outside the 
organization to the inside. The analysis in the first part of this paper shows the relationship 
between staff turnover and the organization in place. On the basis of two performance criteria 
(the increase of staff and the level of complexity of the engineering activities that can be 
achieved), our model shows the link between performance and turnover. 
 
The performance of a design collective can be characterized by two variables: the size 
of the collective, and the complexity of the design work that it is capable of performing. 
 
As regards the size of the design collective, the above simulations show the dual 
impact of turnover. For example: 60 time units after the beginning of the creation process, 
without turnover we obtain a design collective of 500 individuals. With a turnover of 10%, 60 
time units after the beginning of the creation process we obtain a design collective of about 
300 individuals. 10% of the turnover reduces the size of the collective by 40%, 60 time units 
after the beginning of the creation process. 
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Figure 9: Impact of staff turnover on the creation process 
 
The impact of staff turnover on the design collective is explained in terms of two 
effects. The direct effect of the turnover reduces the size of the collective by 10% every year, 
but these resignations should be compensated for by new ad hoc recruitment. This is where 
we will also have an indirect effect of which the mechanism is as follows: by losing 10% of 
the staff every year, there is a loss of individuals (direct effect) but also of a capacity for 
technical supervision. It is therefore not necessarily possible to offset resignations by 
recruiting new staff (in the model we saturate the capacities for supervision). The more 
turnover affects resources with a high level of competency, the greater the indirect effect will 
be because they are the ones who have the training capacity. 
 
In the above example we used different levels of turnover, combined with 60 time 
units after the beginning of the process. We can also consider the impact of turnover at other 
stages of the creation process (at 20 or 40 time units, for instance). 
 
To obtain a synthetic representation of the impact of turnover at a specific stage in the 
creation process, we proceed as follows. The above examples of numbers will serve to explain 
the construction of the graph below. The size of the collective, 60 time units after the 
beginning of the creation unit, without turnover, was 500 individuals. This will be our base 
(500 => 100; see point X). With 10% of turnover the size of the collective 60 time units after 
the beginning of the process of creating the unit is about 300 (thus 60% of our base of 500, 
point Y). 
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Figure 10: Representation of the impact of staff turnover on the size of the design collective 
 
Had we done the exercise with a 20% turnover, 60 time units after the beginning of the 
creation process, we would have obtained point Z (40% of our base of 500, which is 0.4* 500 
= 200 individuals). 
It is thus possible to represent the impact of turnover for each year of the creation process. On 
the graph we have represented the curves at 20, 40, 60 and 80 time-year units. Each curve is 
characterized by its own base, shown on the progression graph below, without turnover. The 
convexity (to be related to the descending diagonal) shows the more than proportional impact 
of turnover. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Explication of baseline (without turnover) 
 
As regards the complexity of the design work that can be carried out in the 
engineering unit abroad, the above simulations enable us to define the four main levels of 
complexity (D, C, B, A) described above. These levels necessitate a learning period (65 time 
units to attain level A without turnover – point A0), which increases in line with the turnover 
(80 time units to reach level A with 10% of turnover – point A10). It is then possible to link 
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the time needed to attain the main levels of complexity to the rate of turnover. This is 
represented in the diagram below (the curves represent the boundaries between one level of 
complexity and the next, and areas between the curves represent the zones in which a certain 
level of design complexity can be achieved ). 
 
 
Figure 12: Representation of the impact of turnover on the complexity of the design that can 
be achieved over time 
 
We see that even if the level of turnover has relatively little impact on the time needed 
to attain a level C design complexity (the curve is almost horizontal), shifting from 10 to 20% 
turnover requires a further 35 time units (i.e. 47% or almost double the amount of time) for 
the engineering unit to be able to attain a level-B design activity (passage from point B10 to 
point B20). We note that even if the threshold of 10% turnover is exceeded, the impact on the 
time necessary for complex design increases substantially. It is therefore necessary to try to 
remain well below this threshold, by means of an appropriate HR policy. If we add the fact 
highlighted above, that 10% of turnover reduces the size of the design collective from 30% at 
40 time units and by 40% at 80 time units, we can recommend that a target be set to maintain 
the turnover below a threshold of 5%. (In this case a reduction in the size of the collective, of 
some 20% at 80 time units, must be accepted and would be manageable if anticipated.) 
 
Our model has thus enabled us to further the explanation of the link between 
performance and organization. We show that the main implication of globalization lies in the 
possibility of creating professional group dynamics – embodied in our simulation in the 
increasing level of competency – and that the conditions of this emergence lie in the absence 
of a blockage of global actor dynamics. These dynamics are embodied in the conditions of co-
presence allowing for learning, and whose impact is evaluated in our simulations through the 
turnover that it seems necessary to maintain at a sufficiently low level (only some 
percentages, below 5%). Finally, during the creation phase, it is necessary to manage the 
factors influencing the global actor dynamics, with a view to stimulating professional group 
dynamics. 
 
 
WHAT ARE THE CONTINGENCY FACTORS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES? 
 
These results are not valid for all R&D activities; they are contingent on the nature of 
the product design activities. We have based our theoretical construction on design activities 
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in the car industry, and research in the aeronautics industry seems to indicate the same type of 
condition for integration and learning in product development collectives. It seems that this is 
not however the case in software engineering, for example. This is explained mainly by the 
possible segmentation of design activities in that field (i.e. the possibility of breaking down a 
new product to be designed, into independent modules). In addition, software products are 
developed with only one type of expertise, unlike manufactured industrial products. The 
nature of the product therefore has an important effect on the importance of interface 
knowledge (between designers of different modules and between the different occupations 
concerned) and therefore on the modalities (complexity and timing) of learning within and 
between professional groups. 
 
Another contingency variable concerns the relative stability of the knowledge 
mobilized to develop a type of product. In our case there was no major change of paradigm in 
the main design principles (likely to undermine the very principles of design – which does not 
exclude marginal innovations) such as radical or architectural innovations. It is possible that 
today's worlds of electronic product design are caught in sufficiently important changes of 
paradigm to invalidate our model in this type of activity. 
 
Finally, it is essentially the complexity of design which is concerned here, and 
therefore the complexity of the product and of the articulation between the different 
professional groups involved. We therefore note that our results are valid for complex 
manufactured products involving several different occupations, where the frameworks of 
knowledge remain relatively stable notwithstanding innovation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we first analysed professional group dynamics and the global actor 
dynamics in an experiment in the globalization of engineering activities. The lessons learned 
from this experiment enabled us to model and to simulate the process of creation of an 
engineering unit abroad. This we used to show the quantity and rhythm of recruitment as well 
as the impact of the staff turnover rate. We then discussed the contingency factors of this type 
of modelling.  
Note that the model presented here is valid only for complex design activities in which 
several occupations are concerned. Moreover, we only consider the creation of an engineering 
unit in a country that has no local development resources. 
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